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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(g). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statement of Issue. 
Was it incorrect for the trial court to deny Penman's request to withdraw his guilty plea 
in light of the fact that he did not understand the nature and elements of the crime when he 
entered his no contest plea, was denied effective assistance of counsel at his preliminary hearing, 
and was not informed of the existence of exculpatory evidence. 
Standard of Review. 
Clear abuse of discretion. State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Statement of Issue. 
Whether the State lost jurisdiction over the defendant by failing to bring defendant to 
answer the criminal charges in accordance with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. 
Standard of Review. 
Correctness, which "means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does 
not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from the ruling of the Third Judicial District Court's denial of 
appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas. The court's ruling which denied appellant's 
motion was entered on August 12, 1992. 
Appellant also challenges the lower court's lack of personal jurisdiction and subject 
matter jurisdiction. See State in Interest of R.N.J.. 908 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
("Jurisdictional issues may be raised for the first time on appeal.") 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case Below. 
The action stems from Penman's October 28, 1988 no contest plea to manslaughter and 
guilty plea to robbery. In June of 1989, acting pro se, Penman filed in the Third District 
Court a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, and Motion 
In Forma Pauperis. 
On June 27, 1991, Penman filed a writ of habeas corpus against the Utah State Board 
of Pardons. At the hearing, the Board of Pardons said the record was "unclear and 
inconclusive." 
On August 14, 1992, the Court denied appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
On September 1, 1992, Penman received a letter from his attorney, Mark Madsen, 
informing him that he intended to withdraw as his attorney. Mr. Madsen withdrew during the 
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time in which a notice of appeal should have been filed regarding Penman's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. However, no notice of appeal was filed. 
On April 29, 1994, Penman filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Attorney 
General's Office responded to Penman's habeas corpus request by filing a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the basis that appellant should be procedurally barred from raising 
claims in a post-conviction proceeding that could have been raised on direct appeal. 
On March 20, 1995, the Honorable William B. Bohling, after hearing oral argument, 
granted the Motion for Summary Judgment by ruling that in spite of Penman's claim that his 
counsel failed to comply with Rule 11 and in spite of the fact that Penman's previous attorney 
failed to comply with Rule 4-604, Code of Judicial Administration, Penman was nonetheless 
not prejudiced thereby. 
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed Judge Bohling's decision and 
ordered reentry of the lower court's August 14, 1992 denial of Penman's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea in order to permit Penman his appeal of first right. This appeal now ensues. 
C. Factual Background. 
1. Roger Eugene Penman ("Penman") was originally charged in January 1988 of 
committing second degree felony homicide, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary and two 
counts of theft stemming from a robbery/homicide which allegedly occurred on or about 
November 1, 1987 at 111 South Allen Street, Midvale, Utah, wherein the victim of an 
apparent robbery, Spencer Nielson, was shot and killed. (R. 5 and 77.) 
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2. Between the dates of November 1, 1987 and November 14, 1987, two juvenile 
suspects suspected of committing the crimes were arrested by detectives of the Midvale Police 
Department. These juveniles subsequently confessed and were thereby charged with first 
degree felony murder and incarcerated pending certification as adults. (R. 5 and 78.) 
3. At approximately the same time that the certification proceedings were pending 
against the juveniles, a high-speed chase occurred between Green River, Wyoming and 
Rawlins, Wyoming. Arrested pursuant to that chase, was Monte Dean "Bo" Johnston 
(subsequently Penman's accuser) and Penman. A third individual, Wendall Devon Baer who 
had eluded authorities, was arrested in Craig, Colorado, made bail and has not been seen 
since. (R. 5-6 and 78.) 
4. Subsequently, Wyoming authorities recovered from both Johnston's and 
Penman's vehicles, oriental artifacts similar to those taken from the Nielson residence. 
Furthermore, 20-gauge shotgun shells were recovered from both Johnston's truck as well as 
Penman's jacket pockets. (R. 6 and 78.) 
5. On or about December 18, 1987, Monte Johnston telephoned Detective Stark 
of the Midvale Police Department (the same detective who coerced the juveniles' confessions). 
Johnston indicated to Detective Stark that Johnston would provide information on two 
homicides in Utah, specifically that of Spencer Nielson as well as another (the latter, 
Johnston's landlord Mr. John Poff), in exchange for favorable treatment, i.e., amnesty. (R. 6 
and 78.) 
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6. At this time, and based upon the erroneous charges against, and the coerced 
confessions from the two juveniles by the Midvale Police, the case was transferred to the Salt 
Lake County Sheriffs Department. Prior to said transfer, however, Detective Stark received 
an immunity agreement from Mr. Walter "Bud" Ellett (of the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
office) for Johnston. (R. 6, 7 and 78.) 
7. By this time appellant had been returned to the State of Nevada on allegations 
regarding a violation of his probation. During Penman's incarceration in Nevada, charges 
were filed against him on the basis of Johnston's unsworn statements. Whereupon, Penman 
filed for a 180-day disposition of detainers under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act 
and on or about April 4, 1988 was returned to the State of Utah. (Copies of the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers are on file with the Nevada State Prison Records Department, the 
States of Nevada and Utah, the Utah County Attorney's Office, as well as the Utah Public 
Defenders Association.) (R. 7 and 78.) 
8. Subsequently, detectives Stark and Jerry Thompson went to Green River, 
Wyoming to interview Johnston. In the course of that interview, Johnston indicated how 
Penman, Wendall Devon Baer, State's witness Rick Lewis (Baer's brother) and Johnston had 
gone to the Nielson residence on Halloween night (on early morning November 1, 1987). All 
were allegedly armed. Johnston alleged Penman possessed a 20-gauge shotgun. Johnston 
further described the theft of the oriental artifacts. He also alleged that he and Penman 
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reentered the Nielson residence whereupon Penman shot and killed Mr. Nielson with a 20-
gauge shotgun. (R. 7, 8 and 79.) 
9. Further, and during the interview with Johnston and Detectives Thompson and 
Stark, Johnston told of a murder of another individual named John Poff. He described in 
detail the location of Mr. Poff s body, refrained from informing the detectives that Mr. Poff 
was his [Johnston's] landlord and further withheld facts regarding Mr. Poff s death. (R. 9 and 
79.) 
10. Additionally, Johnston not only admits to lying in his five unsworn statements 
but Johnston also has a Utah arrest record for giving police false information. (R. 9.) 
11. Another individual detained by the police was Rick Lewis a.k.a. Kevin Baer. 
He either desired or was induced to cooperate with authorities in exchange for reduced charges 
and/or immunity. Subsequently, a sworn statement taken from Mr. Lewis by the Prosecuting 
Attorney on February 4, 1988 implicated Penman in the robbery, burglary and theft charges, 
but substantially conflicted on other issues including who actually committed the homicide. 
Lewis was then held in the Salt Lake County Jail on a material witness warrant where it was 
later discovered that Lewis was also known as Kevin Baer, brother of Penman's co-defendant 
Wendall Devon Baer, and further, that he had an outstanding fugitive from justice warrant 
regarding a commitment to the Ohio State Penitentiary. A subsequent polygraph indicated 
truthfulness on Lewis' part. (R. 10 and 80.) 
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12. Lewis remained in the Salt Lake County Jail while Johnston supposedly 
remained in jail in Green River, Wyoming. Johnston pleaded guilty in Wyoming on felony 
eluding charges and was placed on probation by Wyoming authorities. (R. 10 and 80.) 
13. It was made clear to both Lewis (a.k.a. Baer) and Johnston that any violation 
of their agreements to testify would result in full prosecution of all charges. (R. 11 and 80.) 
14. Shortly before Penman's preliminary hearing and prior to being served a 
subpoena. Johnston absconded and to the best of appellant's knowledge has not been appre-
hended. Moreover, no warrant for Johnston's arrest was issued by the State of Utah. (R. 11 
and 80.) 
15. Prior to his preliminary hearing, Penman was appointed counsel Francis 
Palacios of the Salt Lake Public Defenders Association to represent him. (R. 11.) 
16. During Penman's preliminary hearing, the Prosecuting Attorney improperly 
induced a stipulation from defense counsel that Johnston had been served with a subpoena to 
appear in court. (R. 12.) 
17. Further, the Prosecuting Attorney apparently elicited false and/or perjured 
testimony from State's witness Rick Lewis, allowed that testimony to go uncorrected, and 
failed to disclose the State's grant of immunity to Lewis in exchange for his testimony. 
(R. 12.) 
18. Defense counsel knew or should have known these facts. If she knew of them, 
then her actions are tantamount to collusion with the state prosecutor by entering into a 
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fraudulent stipulation with him and by failing to inform the court that Johnston had not been 
subpoenaed. Moreover, defense counsel knew or should have known the nature of State's 
witness Rick Lewis' false and perjured testimony as well as the nature of his immunity 
agreement. Again, if she knew of these facts yet allowed the court and the defendant to be 
fraudulently misled, she essentially acted in collusion with the State prosecution, resulting or 
otherwise rising to the level of conflict of interest. Likewise, if Penman's counsel failed to 
learn the full nature of these facts then, simply, her performance as counsel was ineffective 
and her performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (R. 13.) 
19. Additionally, Penman's defense counsel failed to inform Penman that motions 
to suppress Johnston's inculpatory statements could be filed, failed to make any attempt to 
insure Johnston's presence at the preliminary hearing, and failed to attempt to impeach State's 
witness Rick Lewis (the only witness placing Penman at the scene of the crime) even though 
Lewis made false and perjured testimony on the stand at Penman's preliminary hearing. 
(R. 222.) 
20. Moreover, during the time of Penman's arrest up to the date of the entrance of 
Penman's pleas, and on the advice of counsel, under the false premise that efforts were being 
made to locate his accuser (Monte Johnston) and that preparations were being made on his 
behalf and in his defense, waived his fast and speedy trial rights as mandated under the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Articles IV (c) and VI (a), as well as the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. (R. 14-15.) 
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21. On October 28, 1988, Penman, a layman unskilled in the law, not knowing the 
nature of the foregoing and on the advice of counsel, entered a no-contest plea to manslaughter 
and guilty plea to robbery. (R. 15.) 
22. Penman is now in possession of documents that corroborate all of the above 
allegations, including: 
(a) results of a ballistics test from the Washington, D.C. FBI Laboratory 
which was compiled on August 12, 1988, six weeks before he entered 
his pleas; 
(b) documents (a sheriffs report as well as a February 4, 1988 sworn state-
ment between the prosecutor and Lewis) which establish ulterior motives 
for State's witness Rick Lewis to testify; 
(c) a court minute entry verifying that Johnston was not served a subpoena; 
(d) verification from the Salt Lake Public Defender's Office that no warrant 
has been issued by the State of Utah for the arrest of Johnston. 
(R. 225 and 226.) 
23. Penman's no contest plea was not based on his admission of guilt in this matter, 
but (in addition to misinformation) upon his fear of receiving life imprisonment if he pled not 
guilty and was forced to defend himself against Lewis and Johnston's testimony. (R. 222.) 
24. At Penman's plea hearing, Rule 11 was not strictly complied with and Penman 
did not understand the elements of the crimes to which he pled No Contest. Page 7 of the plea 
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hearing transcript makes the only mention of Appellant's understanding of the elements of the 
crime as follows: 
And you understand the elements of both of those charges. Now, 
what is your plea, then, to robbery, count 2 Robbery, Second 
Degree? 
(R. 16 and 58.) 
25. Penman's pleas entered October 28, 1988 were entered unknowingly and 
involuntarily. He was not sufficiently informed of the elements of the crimes by the court, 
the prosecutor or defense counsel. He was not informed that he was admitting to the act of 
killing or to being an accessory to murder. Moreover, the facts that set forth the factual basis 
of the charge for which he entered his plea misled him. Therefore, he did not realize the 
actual conduct within the charge of which he now stands convicted. (R. 27.) 
26. If Penman had understood the nature of the charges against him, and likewise 
had he been aware of the fact that Johnston had not been subpoenaed (as represented by the 
prosecutor), or if he had been informed of the immunity agreement provided to the State's 
witness, Lewis, or if he had knowledge of the withheld ballistics tests, he would not have 
entered the plea in question but, rather, would have maintained his plea of not guilty. 
(R. 222-223.) 
27. Post conviction, Penman has been treated by the parole board as the actual 
perpetrator of the homicide and/or as an aider and abettor of the same. Had Penman been 
informed by the court that his pleas would result in his being treated as a murderer or an 
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accomplice in the act of murder, he would not have entered the pleas in question but, in the 
alternative, he would have exercised his right of trial by jury. (R. 223.) 
28. After his return from the Nevada State Prison to the Utah State Prison and in 
August of 1989, Penman's Commitment Order was amended in his absence, striking a plea 
of guilty to criminal homicide manslaughter to reflect a no contest plea to that charge. 
(R. 224.) 
29. In June 1990, acting pro se and after repeated failed attempts to seek assistance 
from the attorneys of record, Penman filed in the Third District Court a Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel, Motion to Withdraw Pleas, and Motion In Forma Pauperis. On 
July 9, 1990, Penman was brought before Judge Rokich of the Third District Court During 
this proceeding, his Motion to Withdraw Pleas was not heard, but his Motion for Appointment 
of Counsel was granted. (R. 25 and 224.) 
30. On August 14, 1992, the court denied appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea. (R. 23.) 
31. At the time the court ruled on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Penman's 
attorney withdrew as counsel and failed to file an appeal. The Court of Appeals has ruled that 
Mr. Madsen's withdrawal was inappropriate and has allowed Penman to file this appeal. 
(R. 23 and 339.) 
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32. In May 1994, Penman received newly discovered evidence in regards to this 
case which was released to him from the Utah Board of Pardons through the Labrum1 
disclosure requirements, of which he did not have previous knowledge. (R. 225 and 226.) 
33. The documents released to him disclosed information of exculpatory nature in 
regards to ballistic tests conducted by the Washington, D.C. FBI Criminal laboratory as early 
as August 12, 1988, two months prior to the entrance of his pleas. (R. 226.) 
34. The documents also disclose information regarding ulterior motives for the 
State's witness Rick Lewis to testify; that indeed Lewis had an immunity agreement with the 
State; that the State failed to disclose these facts; and that Lewis had perjured himself while 
under oath. All these facts were previously unknown and undisclosed to Penman. (R. 226). 
35. It was not until September 24, 1993 that Judge Rokich released documentation 
from his court verifying that a subpoena was not served on State's witness Monte Bo Johnston. 
(R. 226.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Penman Did Not Understand the Nature and Elements of the Offenses 
When He Entered His No Contest Pleas. 
Both guilty and no contest pleas must be entered in strict compliance with Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The burden of ensuring that such compliance exists is 
placed on the trial courts. 
'Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993). 
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Penman did not understand the nature and elements of the offenses and his pleas. 
Furthermore, the trial court failed to cover each element and ensure that Penman understood 
such elements. The Utah Supreme Court has held that this type of plea colloquy is improper. 
The record in this case is devoid of the basic elements regarding the Court's duty to ensure 
compliance with Rule 11. Therefore, Penman was never accorded real notice of the true 
nature of the charges against him. 
B. Penman Was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel at His Preliminary 
Hearing. 
Prejudice may be shown by establishing that but for counsel's deficient performance, 
a reasonable probability exists that the defendant would not have pleaded no contest. Penman 
was denied effective assistance of counsel during the time of his preliminary hearing, during 
the preparation and investigation phases of his case, and during the proceedings when he 
entered his pleas. Penman maintains that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance, 
and/or acted in collusion with the state prosecution, in violation of Penman's rights. Such 
improper actions by Penman's counsel and the prosecuting attorney establish grounds for 
granting Penman's request for an evidentiary hearing. 
C. Penman Would Not Have Pled No Contest Had He Known of the 
Additional Exculpatory Evidence. 
Failure to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant who specifically requests such 
evidence violates that defendant's due process. Since entering his no contest plea, Penman 
has discovered several important items of evidence which, had he been aware of when he 
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entered his plea, he would not have pled no contest. Such evidence includes: (1) results of 
a ballistics test that was exculpatory in nature; (2) documents which establish ulterior motives 
for the State's witness, Rick Lewis, to testify; that Lewis had an immunity agreement with the 
State; that the State failed to disclose these facts; and that Lewis perjured himself while under 
oath; and (3) documents establishing that a subpoena was not served on a State's witness, 
Monte Bo Johnston. 
D. The State Lost Jurisdiction over the Defendant When It Failed to Bring 
Penman to Answer the Criminal Charges in Accordance with the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers. 
The state court lost jurisdiction over Penman by exceeding the time restraints 
articulated under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. In accordance with the Articles 
under the Act, the charges should have been dismissed against Penman, with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PENMAN DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND 
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSES WHEN HE ENTERED HIS NO 
CONTEST PLEAS. 
Both guilty and no contest pleas must be entered in strict compliance with Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 
11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." State v. Gibbons. 740 
P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). U[A] trial court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 in 
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accepting a guilty or no contest plea constitutes good cause, as a matter of law, for the with-
drawal of that plea." State v. Smith. 812 P.2d at 476. 
Strict Rule 11 compliance must be demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty or 
no contest plea is entered.2 State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987). The strict 
compliance analysis is based on whether the plea affidavit and the colloquy with the court, 
taken together, demonstrate strict Rule 11 compliance. State v. Smith. 812 P.2d at 477. 
Rule 11(5) states in relevant part: 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all of those 
rights. 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he is entering the plea: that upon trial the prosecution would 
have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(Emphasis added.) 
2
 For purposes of Rule 11(5), a no contest plea is treated the same as a guilty plea. Rule 11 was 
renumbered and slightly altered in 1993. 
-15-
Because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11, the law places the burden of 
establishing compliance with those requirements on the trial court. State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 
at 1313. 
Penman did not understand the nature and elements of the offenses and his pleas. 
Moreover, Penman signed plea affidavits for both of the charged offenses before the trial court 
at a preliminary hearing on October 28, 1988. The Court in Gibbons recognized that "to 
make a knowing guilty plea, the defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged 
and the relationship of the law to the facts." 740 P.2d at 1312. 
Penman pled "no contest" to the charge of manslaughter. Penman's manslaughter plea 
affidavit sets forth the elements and facts relative to the manslaughter count as follows: 
Elements: That the defendant, as a party to the offense, recklessly caused the 
death of another. 
(R. 56.) 
Facts: On October 31, 1987 at 111 South Allen Street, Midvale, Utah, the 
defendant was a party to a robbery, during the commission of which the victim 
of that robbery, Spencer Nielson, was killed. 
(R. 56-57.) 
On October 28, 1988, when Penman entered his plea, the Court merely read the 
elements and facts of the offense as they appeared on the plea affidavit, to the prosecuting 
attorney, but did not engage Penman in a colloquy regarding the elements. Then after simi-
larly reading the facts and elements of the robbery charge, the Court at page 7 of the plea 
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transcript made the only mention of Penman's understanding of the elements of the crime as 
follows: 
THE COURT: AND YOU UNDERSTAND THE ELEMENTS OF BOTH 
OF THOSE CHARGES. NOW, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA, 
THEN, TO ROBBERY, COUNT 2, ROBBERY, SECOND 
DEGREE? 
THE DEFENDANT: THAT WOULD BE GUILTY YOUR HONOR. 
(R. 58.) 
The court then went on to inquire of the defendant on Page 7 of the plea transcript: 
THE COURT: . . . ARE YOU ENTERING A PLEA BECAUSE 
YOU DID, IN FACT, COMMIT THE ROBBERY? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES. I WAS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE OF 
ROBBERY; YES, YOUR HONOR. 
(R. 58.) 
It is easy to see how an ill-advised, unskilled layman misconstrued the terminology of 
"party to the offense of a robbery" to encompass "as a party to the offense" and improperly 
(unknowingly) entered a plea to a criminal manslaughter offense that ambiguously represents 
defendant's conduct as "a party to the offense of robbery during the commission of which, the 
victim of that robbery . . . was killed." 
It is exactly this type of uncertainty and ambiguity that a proper plea colloquy, when 
undertaken, is intended to avoid. The court, by omission, failed to inform appellant that he 
was admitting to the act of killing or to being an accessory to murder. In fact, the record is 
silent with respect to the crime of murder and the transcript reveals no dialogue between the 
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court and the defendant pertaining to the fact that defendant's plea would be an admission of 
those elements. 
In State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court held that this 
type of plea colloquy is improper. LdL. at 995. In Abeyta, as in this case, the judge failed to 
discuss the elements of the crimes with the defendant. The record in the instant case is devoid 
of these basic elements as appellant was never accorded real notice of the true nature of the 
charge against him. The trial court failed to personally establish that defendant's guilty plea 
was knowing and voluntary and that appellant understood the elements of the crime. The 
record reveals that the court made the only mention of Penman's understanding of the 
elements as follows: "And you understand the elements of both of those charges. . . . " 
(R. 16 and 26.) 
In this case, there was no specific inquiry regarding the elements of the charges. 
Penman's understanding of the elements was apparently taken for granted when in fact 
Penman clearly did not understand the charges. At no time prior to the Court accepting his 
plea did Penman understand that he was admitting to causing the death of Spencer Nielson. 
In fact, Paragraph 9 of the plea affidavit further ambiguously represents that: 
OTHER AGREEMENTS OF THIS PLEA NEGOTIATION INCLUDE . . . 
that a letter will be sent by the State to the Board of Pardons addressing the 
State's inability to prove Mr. Penman as the actual perpetrator of the homicide. 
(R. 43.) 
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In Penman, like Abeyta. the record merely reflects the court's inquiry as to whether 
counsel, not the defendant, was satisfied that the elements recited in the plea affidavit 
constituted the elements of the offenses. 
In this case, the prosecutor stated that he was satisfied that the plea affidavit listed the 
elements necessary to support the charges as follows: 
THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, COUNSEL. WITH REGARD TO THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, 
MANSLAUGHTER, THAT THE DEFENDANT, AS A 
PARTY TO THE OFFENSE, RECKLESSLY CAUSED 
THE DEATH OF ANOTHER; DOES THAT 
CONSTITUTE THE ELEMENTS? 
[COUNSEL]: IT DOES, YOUR HONOR. 
(R. 56. Emphasis added.) 
Simply, the trial court failed to clarify the foregoing as omissions, as well as the 
ambiguities evident in the plea colloquy and plea affidavits with the defendant. As stated by 
Justice Stewart in Abeyta. "[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the [plea] affidavit must be 
clarified during the plea hearing." 852 P.2d at 996. 
The court then signed the affidavits without informing Penman of the elements of the 
offenses which the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt. Clearly, 
Penman was not questioned regarding his homicide plea to the proper degree. As a result, his 
due process rights have been denied. 
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II. PENMAN WAS DENIED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
REPRESENTATION AS WELL AS THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. 
In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant can establish prejudice by demonstrating that 
but for counsel's deficient performance a reasonable probability exists that the defendant 
would not have pleaded guilty. See, Hill v. Lockhart 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Penman was 
denied the constitutional right of representation as well as the substantial right of preliminary 
examination into the charges. Penman was also denied effective assistance of counsel during 
the preparation and investigation phases of his case and during the proceedings wherein he 
entered his pleas and was sentenced by the court. 
Penman maintains that his defense counsel acted in collusion with the state prosecutor 
by entering into a fraudulent stipulation with the prosecutor and by failing to inform the court 
that Johnston had not been subpoenaed. Moreover, Penman's court-appointed attorney knew 
or should have known the nature of State's witness Rick Lewis' false and perjured testimony 
as well as the nature of his immunity agreement. If Penman's attorney knew of these facts, 
she allowed the court and the defendant to be misled, making her actions tantamount to 
collusion with the state prosecutor, resulting or otherwise rising to the level of conflict of 
interest. Likewise, if Penman's attorney failed to learn the full nature of these facts, her 
performance simply fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (R. 13.) See. 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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Penman's situation is deserving of reversal because not only did Penman misunderstand 
the effects of his plea due to the lack of explanation, but Penman has also been prejudiced by 
the actions of his counsel and the fact that he was not made aware of additional exculpatory 
and/or impeachment evidence when he entered his guilty pleas. As a result, the fact-finding 
process of the preliminary hearing and/or plea colloquy was so tainted by ineffective assistance 
of counsel, collusion, prosecutorial misconduct or acts of subterfuge as to render those 
proceedings devoid of any meaningful due process. This prevented the binding court from 
fully and impartially determining the questions of law and fact relevant to the case, resulting 
in the denial of a preliminary examination into the charges alleged against Penman, the 
unknowing and involuntary entry of Penman's pleas, and ultimately the denial of Penman's 
liberty without due process of law. 
Because Penman was deprived of his substantial right of preliminary examination, the 
pleas should be declared a nullity and the conviction vacated. 
III. PENMAN WOULD NOT HAVE PLED NO CONTEST HAD HE 
KNOWN OF THE ADDITIONAL EXCULPATORY AND IMPEACH-
MENT EVIDENCE. 
In Bradv v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83, 86-89 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the government's failure to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant who 
specifically requested it violated defendant's due process rights. See Miller v. Angliker. 848 
F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1988) (the Brady holding also applies to guilty pleas that are 
affected by the government's nondisclosure of evidence). 
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Since entering his no contest plea, Penman has discovered several important items of 
evidence. If Penman had been aware of such evidence when he entered his plea, he would not 
have pled no contest to the charges filed against him. Such evidence includes: 1) results of 
a ballistics test that was exculpatory in nature; 2) documents which establish ulterior motives 
for the State's witness, Rick Lewis, to testify, that Lewis had an immunity agreement with the 
state, that the state failed to disclose these facts, and that Lewis perjured himself while under 
oath; and 3) documents establishing that a subpoena was not served on State's witness Monte 
Bo Johnston. 
The aforementioned ballistics report was compiled on August 12, 1988, two months 
before Penman entered his no contest pleas. Failure to disclose the existence of such a report, 
in addition to other nondisclosures (set forth in Penman's Writ of Habeas Corpus) described 
herein, sufficiently justify the remedies requested in Penman's petition. 
Penman's pleas were not voluntary because they were based on false and misleading 
information provided to the court and to Penman. 
Monte "Bo" Johnston was the sole witness for the State identifying Penman as the 
individual who shot Mr. Nielson. However, Mr. Johnston, who was given immunity by the 
State, failed to appear at the preliminary hearing on June 16, 1988 and upon information and 
belief is currently a fugitive from justice. The only remaining State's witness, Rick Lewis, 
also a participant in the robbery, placed Penman at the scene but could not identify Penman 
as the individual who shot Mr. Nielson. On the contrary, Mr. Lewis identified Mr. Johnston 
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as the individual who physically abused Mr. Nielson and also said that he thought 
Mr. Johnston was the individual who shot Mr. Nielson. 
Furthermore, at the June 16, 1988 preliminary hearing, Mr. Lewis, the State's only 
witness, lied under oath regarding any "deals" he had made in exchange for testifying. The 
following questioning occurred there by the prosecutor: 
Q And have there been any promises as to what disposition that you will 
personally have concerning the outcome of this case. 
A No. 
Q No one has mentioned that you will have charges filed, not have charges 
filed or anything of that nature; is that correct? 
A That's right. 
(R. 38.) 
However, in a prior sworn statement by Mr. Lewis gave to the prosecutor on 
February 4, 1988, the following colloquy occurred: 
Q If in the event that you do not make your daily call ins or for other 
reasons you are picked up for other charges or for some reason we find 
that your statement given today is not truthful statement, that all deals 
are off. That you will then be filed on as a defendant in this matter and 
that all statements previously given, excuse me, and that this statement 
given now under oath will then be used against you. Is that understood? 
A Yes. 
Q Just to make it perfectly clear, Rick, everything you've told us is the 
truth. 
-23-
A Yes. 
Q If for some reason, as I stated before, you're not telling us the truth all 
deals are off. 
A Uh huh (indicating affirmatively). 
Q Furthermore, not only all deals are off, we will file against you as a 
defendant, charge you with murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated 
burglary and two counts of theft and use this statement against you. Are 
you aware of that? 
A Okay. 
(R. 38-39, emphasis added.) 
The sheriff's report (released by the Utah State Board of Pardons) relating the 
following colloquy between sheriff's officer, Jerry Thompson, and the State's witness, Rick 
Lewis, further revealed the extent of Lewis' deal with the State: 
LEWIS: I STILL HAVE NOT CHANGED MY MIND, I WILL KEEP 
MY PART OF THE BARGAIN. I WILL TESTIFY AND 
WILL DO EVERYTHING ELSE I TOLD YOU I WOULD. 
Penman did not become aware of Mr. Lewis' untruthful statement regarding any 
"deals," and corresponding issues regarding credibility, until some time after his conviction. 
(R. 39.) At the time of entry of his pleas, Penman believed that both Mr. Johnston and 
Mr. Lewis had turned State's witness and would be testifying against him. This was a signi-
ficant factor in Penman's decision to enter into the plea agreements. Id, 
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IV. THE STATE LOST JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT WHEN 
IT FAILED TO BRING PENMAN TO ANSWER THE CRIMINAL 
CHARGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT 
ON DETAINERS. 
During Penman's incarceration in Nevada, charges were filed against him by the State 
of Utah on the basis of Johnston's unsworn statements. Whereupon, Penman filed for a 180-
day disposition of detainers under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act as contained in 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-29-5. On or about April 4, 1988, he was extradited to the State of 
Utah. (R. 7 and 78.) Once within the jurisdiction and custody of Utah authorities, the 
Detainers Act authorizes and provides the State a 120-day prosecution period. If a final 
disposition on the charges is not reached within that time (absent a waiver of the defendant) 
the charges must be dismissed, with prejudice, and the defendant returned to the custody of 
the sending state. See, Articles IV and VI of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. 
During the time of Penman's arrest up to the date of the entrance of his pleas, on the 
advice of counsel, and under the false premise that efforts were being made to locate his 
accuser (Monte Johnston), Penman involuntarily waived his rights under the Detainers Act. 
(R. 14-15.) 
In order to waive the rights accorded under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 
Penman must knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily have chosen not to enjoy that right. 
(See State v. Dastrup. 818 P.2d 594, 596 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 
1119, 1122 (Utah 1991); Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980). 
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Based upon the errors (due process violations) cited above and herein, which were 
committed during the preliminary examination, Penman's waiver was involuntary and the 
court was divested of jurisdiction of the defendant requiring dismissal of the charges, with 
prejudice, as per the Detainers Act.3 
In Utah, the "right of a preliminary examination . . . [is] a substantial one." State v. 
Pay. 146 P. 300 (Utah 1915). Appellant submits that error committed during preliminary 
examination is not harmless, if it renders the hearing inadequate. See Coleman v. Burnett, 
477 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
The appellant was not originally bound over by the Circuit Court on the homicide 
charge (see Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, if 20, p. 13, Penman v. Carver. No. 
940903286HC) but was initially provided thirty days to brief the issue. This, taken in 
conjunction with the fact that the prosecutor during the preliminary hearing failed to disclose 
the State's grant of immunity to Lewis, suborned perjury from that witness concerning "deals" 
the State had made with him in exchange for his testimony, allowed that testimony to go 
uncorrected and misrepresented that appellant's accuser (Johnston) was subpoenaed to appear 
in court (when in reality he was not) deprived appellant of his substantial right to a preliminary 
3A final disposition was not reached in the case until October 28, 1988, when Penman entered his 
pleas, and November 28, 1988, when he was sentenced - a full 210 days post Penman's extradition 
to Utah and three months past the expiration of the prosecution period authorized under the 
Detainers Act. 
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hearing into the charges. Additionally, it may have deprived him of the opportunity to show 
that another and not the defendant committed the crime in question. 
Had these facts been disclosed to appellant during the 30-day briefing period accorded 
by the Circuit Court to brief the bind-over issue, these matters could and most probably would 
have been presented to the Circuit Court at that time and on the defendant's behalf. 
Because appellant was not accorded an adequate preliminary examination and was thus 
not properly bound over to answer the criminal charges, the district court never acquired 
jurisdiction over the defendant to accept the pleas in question; therefore, the conviction should 
be vacated. 
It was held in State v. Freeman. 71 P.2d 196, 200 (Utah 1937) that a district court does 
not acquire jurisdiction over a defendant as a result of original complaint, but rather from the 
binding over of the defendant by a magistrate. It stands to reason, therefore, that if the 
preliminary hearing was not waived and the examination was tainted with error rendering that 
proceeding inadequate, appellant incurred the loss of a substantial right of due process. 
The trial court lost jurisdiction over appellant by exceeding the time restraints articu-
lated under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the charges should have been dismissed 
with prejudice in accordance with the articles under the Detainers Act. 
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CONCLUSION 
Penman asks this court to vacate his conviction and order his release from custody 
and/or for any other relief deemed appropriate by this court that is not prejudicial to the 
appellant. 
DATED this /g> day of May, 1997. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Reed L./Martineau 
Korey D. Rasmussen 
Attorneys for Appellant 
N:\222222\34\BRIEF3.APP 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of May, 1997, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT (Case No. 960639-CA, Utah Court of 
Appeals) to be served upon the parties listed below by placing true and correct copies 
thereof in an envelope and causing the same to be mailed first-class, postage prepaid, to: 
James H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
iorey D. Jrasmussen 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 4-603 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1024 
(2) The chair of the committee shall have experience in and knowledge of 
the criminal justice system and shall have an interest in the rights of victims 
and witnesses. The chair shall not be a member of the judiciary or be em-
ployed by the judicial branch of government. 
(3) On or before September 1st of each odd-numbered year, the chair shall 
appoint the members of the Victims' Rights Committee. Members shall con-
sist of: a county attorney, a sheriff, a corrections field services administrator, 
a juvenile court representative, an appointed victim advocate, a municipal 
attorney, a municipal chief of police and other representatives as appropriate. 
Members shall have experience in and knowledge of the criminal justice sys-
tem and shall have an interest in the rights of victims and witnesses. 
(4) The chair may succeed himself or herself at the discretion of the presid-
ing judge. The members of the committee may succeed themselves at the 
discretion of the chair. 
(5) The Committee shall act as a clearinghouse to distribute and standard-
ize information relevant to victims of crime and the services available to them 
within the judicial district. It shall assume a leadership role in developing an 
educational program for the public as well as professionals who provide ser-
vices to victims. Victims who have complaints may submit them in writing to 
the Committee. The Committee will note them for informational purposes and 
then forward them to the appropriate agency for action. Minutes of the Com-
mittee meetings shall be forwarded to the Commission on Criminal and Juve-
nile Justice for distribution to local Committees on a statewide basis. The 
Commission shall also provide minutes of the meetings of the Governor's 
Council on Victims to the local Committees. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Rule 4-603. Motions for reduction of offense at sentencing. 
Intent: 
To reduce delays in sentencing by providing the court and the prosecutor 
prior notice of the filing of a motion to reduce a criminal offense pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-402. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-3-402 shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior to the 
date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten 
days of the entry of conviction. 
(2) The motion shall state the grounds for requesting the reduction of of-
fense. 
(3) A copy of the motion shall be sent to the prosecuting attorney to provide 
the prosecutor with an opportunity to review the motion and respond to it at 
or prior to the time of hearing. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Rule 4-604. Withdrawal of counsel in criminal and delin-
quency cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for withdrawal of counsel in criminal 
cases. 
Applicability: 
- ^ oVioii flnnlv to all trial courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Withdrawal of counsel prior to entry of judgment. 
(A) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney 
may not withdraw as counsel of record in criminal cases without the 
approval of the court. 
(B) A motion to withdraw as an attorney in a criminal case shall be 
made in open court with the defendant present unless otherwise ordered 
by the court. 
(2) Withdrawal of counsel after entry of judgment. Prior to permitting with-
drawal of trial counsel, the trial court shall require counsel to file a written 
statement certifying: 
(A) That the defendant has been advised of the right to file a motion for 
new trial or to seek a certificate of probable cause, and if in counsel's 
opinion such action is appropriate, that the same has been filed. 
(B) That the defendant has been advised of the right to appeal and if in 
counsel's opinion such action is appropriate, that a Notice of Appeal, a 
Request for Transcript, and in appropriate cases, an Affidavit of 
Impecuniosity and an Order requiring the appropriate county to bear the 
costs of preparing the transcript have been filed. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; March 31, 1992.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
Rule 4-605. Use of unpublished opinions in criminal cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform standard for the use of unpublished opinions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value 
and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of 
applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 
For the purposes of this rule, any memorandum decision, per curiam opinion, 
or other disposition of the Court designated "not for official publication" shall 
be regarded as an unpublished opinion. 
(Added effective January 15, 1990; amended effective November 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment added the last sentence. 
Rule 4-606. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Former Rule 4-606, providing was repealed effective March 31, 1992. For 
for the uniform recommended fine schedule, present comparable provisions, see Rule 4-302. 
Rule 4-607. Presentence investigation reports. 
Intent: 
To provide uniform guidelines and timeframes for the completion and deliv-
ery of presentence investigation reports. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Justice Courts and the Department 
of Corrections. 
Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 36g 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS thereto; and where defendant was not given 
time to plead to such information, court com. 
Additional time to plead. mitted reversible error. State v. Jensen, 83 
Waiver of objections.
 U t a h 4 5 2 ) 30 p.2d 203 (1934). 
Additional time to plead. Waiver of objections. 
Where original information did not state Subdivision (c) merely reaffirms the general 
public offense and was amended so as to state legal rule that all objections, including those to 
public offense for first time, as amending infor- proceedings in the circuit court, must be made 
mation in larceny prosecution so as to allege before a guilty plea is entered or the objections 
ownership of property alleged to have been sto- will be waived. State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 
len, it was equivalent of a new information re- 496 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other 
quiring arraignment of defendant and his plea grounds, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 261(1), 
Law §§ 433 to 438. 263, 264. 
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 355 et 
seq. 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reason-
able time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the 
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant re-
fuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for 
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defen-
dant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the atten-
dance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, 
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
ff) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
i-iibdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
f£r setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
iEtke a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
^fe) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be 
approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court, 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agree-
ment and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. 
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant 
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defen-
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
|«mtest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
MWview of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defen-
fdant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
iff (j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
[Ihe other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
ireasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance With Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. (Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ritnt, effective May 1,1993, revised the subdi-|jkfon designations, substituting letters for 
pombers and vice versa; inserted "or guilty 
find mentally ilT in the introductory para-
fjpPk m Subdivision (e) and in Subdivision (f); 
Igjwte Subdivision (e)(3) to list more rights; |lto&*rted "and if applicable, the minimum man-
ijtiwy nature of the minimum sentence" in 
[^division (e)(5); added Subdivision (e)(8); de-
iffed "that contemplates entry of a plea in the 
*P*ctation that other charges will be dropped 
or dismissed" after "has been reached" in Sub-
division (h)(2); added Subdivision (i); and made 
stylistic changes throughout the rule. 
The 1996 amendment deleted "pursuant to 
Rule 21.5" from the end of the first sentence in 
Subdivision (b) and added Subdivision (j)« 
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of 
pleas, plea discussions or related statements, 
U.R.E. 410. 
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea 
of guilty or no contest, § 77-13-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
pliance with rule. 
' or no contest plea. 
Qitional pleas. 
planation sufficient, 
ctual basis, 
failure to explain. 
^sequences of plea. 
^Kature and elements of offense. 
7-*ught against self-incrimination. 
J^cial burden. 
/°luntarine8s. 
gHisence of finding. 
•^Method of establishing. 
uthdrawal. 
" agreements. 
—Refusal of court to comply. 
—Sentencing. 
Scope of review. 
Cited. 
Compliance with rule. 
A trial court's failure to comply strictly with 
this rule in accepting a guilty or no contest 
plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for the 
withdrawal of that plea. State v. Gibbons, 740 
P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987); State v. Smith, 812 
P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The strict compliance rule announced in 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) 
was a clear break with the Supreme Court's 
rulings in previous cases dealing with the va-
lidity of guilty pleas and should not be retroac-
tively applied to guilty pleas taken before the 
78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by 
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of 
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Stare decisis. panels of that court and all courts of lower 
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involv- R2d 677 (Utah 1995). 
ing the same legal issues decided by other 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction* 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
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except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony, 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony, 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity, 
(1) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5, 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1992 amend 
ment, effective April 27 1992, added Subsec 
tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through 
(k) 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4) 
The 1995 amendment effective May 1, 1995 
substituted "School and Institutional Trust 
ANALYSIS 
Decisions of Board of Pardons 
Extraordinary writs 
Final order 
Habeas corpus proceedings 
Post-conviction review 
Scope 
— Sentence reduction 
Cited 
Decis ions of Board of Pardons . 
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from 
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, ex-
cept when the petition additionally challenges 
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree 
felony or a capital felony Then the appeal is to 
be heard by the Supreme Court Preece v 
House, 886 P2d 508 (Utah 1994) 
Lands Board of Tru^tee^ Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestrv actions reviewed by the 
executive director oi t i e Department of Natural 
Resources for 'Boaia of State Lands in Sub-
section (2)(a) 
The 1996 amendment bv ch 159 effective 
July 1, 1996 substituted "Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lana-~ for 'Division of Sover 
eign Lands and Fore>trv in Subsection (2>(a) 
The 1996 amendment by ch 198 effective 
July 1 1996 deleted iormer Subsection (2)(d), 
listing appeals from circuit courts and redesig 
nated former Sub^ecnons (2)(e) to (2)(k as 
(2)(d) to I2)(j) 
This section is &et out as reconciled b\ the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel 
Cross-References — Composition and ju-
risdiction of mil i tan court, §§ 39 6-15 39-6-16 
Extraordinary writs. 
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over a 
petition for a writ of mandamus directed 
against a judge of the district court based on its 
authority under this section to enforce compli-
ance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid 
of its appellate jurisdiction Barnard v Murphy, 
882 P2d 679 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
The term "original" m § 78-2-2(2) adds noth-
ing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction — 
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing 
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals — 
because jurisdiction over petitions for extraor-
dinary writs necessarily invokes a court's juris-
diction to consider a petition originally filed 
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction 
over cases that onginated elsewhere Barnard 
v Murphy, 882 P2d 679 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
Because, under this section, the Court of 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons* 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged 
to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 15. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the written demand 
referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void the request. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment 
into law — Text of agreement. 
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and 
entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in 
the form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree that: 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in 
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, 
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and 
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose 
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such 
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based 
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find 
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanat-
ing from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of 
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide 
such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of 
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of 
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcer-
ated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant 
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability 
is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on 
an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article 
IV hereof. 
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ARTICLE III 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a Den*l 
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the contin! 
uance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state 
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which m 
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial 
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting 
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written 
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition 
to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good 
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court 
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable 
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate 
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, 
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time 
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the 
state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in 
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, 
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall 
promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecut-
ing official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any 
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a 
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on 
which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all 
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose 
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The 
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the 
prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts 
in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for 
final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. 
Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by 
copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not 
had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to 
the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such 
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, 
and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a 
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with 
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein 
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving 
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his 
term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition 
shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in 
any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the 
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77-29-3* Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged 
to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 15. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the written demand 
referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void the request. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment 
into law — Text of agreement. 
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and 
entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in 
the form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree that: 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in 
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, 
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and 
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose 
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such 
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based 
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find 
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanat-
ing from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of 
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide 
such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of 
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of 
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcer-
ated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant 
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability 
is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on 
an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article 
IV hereof. 
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ARTICLE III 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a Den*! 
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the conKn! 
uance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state 
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which m 
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial 
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting 
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written 
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition 
to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good 
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court 
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable 
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate 
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, 
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time 
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the 
state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in 
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, 
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall 
promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecut-
ing official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any 
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a 
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on 
which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all 
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose 
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The 
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the 
prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts 
in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for 
final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. 
Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by 
copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not 
had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to 
the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such 
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, 
and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a. 
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with 
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein 
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving 
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his 
term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition 
shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in 
any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the 
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purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to 
the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this 
agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a 
concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the 
request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the 
request. 
ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indict-
ment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner 
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of 
imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article 
V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or 
availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is 
incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, 
information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted 
the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after 
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within 
which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for 
temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion 
of the prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) 
hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish 
the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the 
prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served 
on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility 
of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the 
prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and 
appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the 
prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the 
request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor. 
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be 
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in 
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his 
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant 
any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any 
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery 
as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or 
denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not 
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contem-
plated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of 
imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or 
complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter 
an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the 
appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary 
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custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such 
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order 
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for fi^ 
disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall 
accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In 
the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state 
shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the 
prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial 
arrangement may be approved by the custodian. 
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of 
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand: 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the 
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given. 
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on 
the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which 
the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made. 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary 
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is 
not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV 
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, infor-
mation or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the 
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any 
force or effect. 
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the 
purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or 
more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of 
the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges 
arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and 
while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be 
required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly 
used for persons awaiting prosecution. 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this 
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is 
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time 
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be 
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of 
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow. 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as 
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to 
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and 
any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as 
an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner 
permitted by law. 
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant 
to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody 
of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments, 
informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be 
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring 
for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall 
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govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary 
agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as 
between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to 
alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and 
officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and 
its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor. 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods 
provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time 
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to 
stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this 
agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill. 
ARTICLE VII 
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting 
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and 
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this 
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information 
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when 
such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may 
withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the 
withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already 
initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes 
effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof. 
ARTICLE DC 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. 
The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, 
sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the 
Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability 
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any 
government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If 
this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party 
hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining 
states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable 
matters. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-5, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
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